SLOTTING ALLOWANCES AS A FACILITATING
PRACTICE BY FOOD PROCESSORS IN WHOLESALE
GROCERY MARKETS: PROFITABILITY
AND WELFARE EFFECTS
STEPHEN F. HAMILTON
Slotting allowances, which are lump-sum transfers paid by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in
return for various retail concessions, are becoming increasingly common in wholesale grocery markets.
This article extends the literature on slotting allowances by considering two features that previously
have been ignored: the role of food processors in determining these pricing arrangements, and the
effect of slotting allowances on the size and distribution of economic surplus. Slotting allowances
motivated by food processors increase procurement quantities and farm prices, and this raises farm
surplus, increases total producer surplus, and improves consumer welfare in the food system.
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Slotting allowances are lump-sum fees paid
by food manufacturers to grocery retailers in
exchange for access to the consumer market.
Slotting allowances per se emerged in 1984
and have since become an increasingly com
mon practice in wholesale supermarket trans
actions. While the term “slotting allowance”
technically refers to a charge collected by a gro
cery retailer in exchange for shelf space (com
puter inventory systems divide shelf space at
supermarkets into “slots”), the term is often
used generically to describe various types of
wholesale payments, such as introductory fees
for new products, periodic stocking fees for ex
isting products, ﬂoor charges for the manufac
turer to make sales presentations, and display
fees for special merchandising and promotion.
The salient characteristic that uniﬁes this pay
ment structure is that the slotting allowance
is a lump-sum charge that does not vary with
subsequent retailer sales.
There is considerable disagreement in the
literature on the purpose slotting allowances
serve. At the center of the debate is the im
portant policy question of whether slotting alStephen F. Hamilton is associate professor in the Department of
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lowances have procompetitive or anticompet
itive effects in the food system.1
The procompetitive view of slotting al
lowances is that lump-sum payments act
as an instrument to ration new product
introductions. Under circumstances in which
agents have asymmetric information on the
quality of a new product, a slotting allowance
can enhance efﬁciency by serving as a sig
naling or screening device (Lariviere and
Padmanabhan, Sullivan, Richards and
Patterson). The basic idea is that when
manufacturers have superior information
regarding the quality of new products, slot
ting allowances mitigate the moral-hazard
problem by allocating shelf space only to
new products that exceed a threshold level
of quality, which reduces the rate of product
failure. This argument provides a compelling
explanation for introductory fees; however, it
also raises an important unanswered question.
If slotting allowances indeed exist to align
incentives under asymmetric information,
then why do food manufacturers also pay
slotting allowances on well-established prod
ucts for which brand acceptance is reasonably
well understood? Slotting allowances are
also paid to retailers on a periodic basis to
maintain shelf space on existing products.
1
This question is also at the heart of the broader literature on
vertical restraints.

The simularity of the payment structure that
supports slotting allowances for new product
introductions and for periodic activities such
as stocking, displaying, merchandising, and
promotion suggests the need to develop a
unifying theory that encompasses all forms of
two-part tariff arrangements in the wholesale
grocery market.
The anticompetitive view of slotting al
lowances is that lump-sum payments act as
an instrument for retailers to exercise market
power. Imperfectly competitive retailers have
an incentive to use slotting allowances either
as a mechanism to price discriminate among
manufacturers (Cannon and Bloom, Desiraju)
or as a facilitating practice to reduce down
stream price competition in the consumer mar
ket (Shaffer). The essence of Shaffer’s argu
ment, which is closely related to the argument
made here, is that a retailer can use revenue
collected from a slotting allowance to support
the payment of a higher wholesale grocery
price. The payment of a higher wholesale price
has no direct effect on the retailer’s proﬁt—
the cost of this is exactly offset by the slotting
allowance—but is proﬁtable nonetheless for its
indirect effect on the behavior of rival grocery
retailers. A high wholesale price signals rival
retailers the intent to set a correspondingly
high price in the retail market, and this soft
ens downstream price competition.
A merit of the anticompetitive view is
that retail market power provides a unifying
motivation to explain all forms of two-part
tariffs in the wholesale grocery market. How
ever, there is a sense in which the retail mar
ket power story overﬁts the practice. If slotting
allowances emerge as a mechanism for retail
ers to exercise market power, then this raises
the question of why the fees are systemati
cally levied only in processed food categories
of the supermarket? Slotting allowances are
frequently exchanged in highly concentrated,
processed product categories such as frozen
and refrigerated foods, dry grocery, beverages,
snacks, candy, and microwaveable shelf-stable
foods. In the much-studied product class of
fresh produce, by contrast, it is exclusively
the shippers of bagged salad and other freshcut, branded products—food processors, not
commodity producers—who pay slotting al
lowances to retailers (Calvin et al.).
This article develops a theory of slotting
allowances around food processor market
power. The theory encompasses all forms
of two-part tariff arrangements observed in
wholesale grocery markets, yet provides some

insight to explain why the practice has emerged
in some product categories but not in others.
Given the importance of the processing sec
tor as a source of value-added in the food sys
tem, it is somewhat surprising to note that the
role of food processors in determining arrange
ments for slotting allowances is a subject that
has been entirely ignored.
The observations developed here are based
on a vertical market framework in which food
production is organized between an upstream
farm product market and a series of down
stream markets (wholesale and retail) for dif
ferentiated processed goods. In the upstream
market, competitive farm producers sell a ho
mogeneous farm product to imperfectly com
petitive food processors. This conceptual treat
ment of the farm product market joins an
emerging literature in this journal on imperfect
competition in the food system, which posits an
oligopsonistic relationship between farm pro
ducers and food processors (see, e.g., Sexton,
Chen and Lent, Wann and Sexton, Hamilton
and Sunding). This focus on food processor
behavior provides a formal link between the
farm product market and the wholesale gro
cery market that allows welfare implications
to be derived in terms of the size and distri
bution of economic surplus at all stages of the
food system.
The model produces several notable welfare
implications. Unlike the case of two-part tariffs
that arise through retailer market power, slot
ting allowances motivated by processor mar
ket power raise farm surplus; increase the
combined producer surplus of farmers, proces
sors, and retailers; and improve consumer wel
fare (under both consumer surplus and utilitybased measures).
The Model
The starting point for the analysis is a verti
cal food system comprising a single upstream
market and a single downstream market. In
the upstream market, competitive ﬁrms sell a
homogeneous farm product to an oligopsonis
tic food processing industry, and, in the down
stream market, the food processors sell a ﬁn
ished processed good to grocery retailers at
the wholesale level. Further downstream, of
course, is the retail market between grocery re
tailers and consumers. However, because the
central forces of the model operate on incen
tives that develop through the multimarket
contact of food processors at the upstream and

Contract Stage:
Food processors
choose contract
terms ( pˆ i , sˆi , i =1,2)

Acceptance Stage:
Grocery retailer(s)
accept or reject the
contract

Procurement Stage:
Food processors
choose procurement
levels of the farm
product (xi, i =1,2)

Figure 1. The timing of the game
wholesale levels of the food system, the retail
market, which plays no direct role in the anal
ysis, is initially suppressed by assuming a com
petitive retail industry. The model is then ex
tended to encompass consumer markets (and
potentially noncompetitive retailers) in subse
quent sections.
The model considers slotting allowances
that arise in a ﬁxed price contract form. A
ﬁxed price contract, which speciﬁes a whole
sale price and a lump-sum transfer, is a com
monly employed contract form in wholesale
grocery markets (Calvin et al.).
Consider an upstream industry that pro
duces a homogeneous farm product.2 The farm
product is sold in an oligopsony market com
prising n food processing ﬁrms. The level of
farm product use by processor i is denoted
xi and total
 farm product use in the indus
try is X = i xi . The price in the farm prod
uct market is given by the (inverse) farm sup
ply function, which is denoted by p f (X ), with
f
px (X ) ≡ dp f (X )/d X > 0. The farm product
is used by processor i to produce a (differ
entiated) ﬁnished processed good, yi , accord
ing to the production function yi = f i (xi ),
and this satisﬁes f xi (xi ) ≡ d f i (xi )/d xi > 0 and
f xi x (xi ) ≡ d 2 f i (xi )/d xi2 ≤ 0. In the absence of
a slotting allowance, food processor i sells her
ﬁnished processed good to competitive retail
buyers at a noncontracted wholesale price of
piw .
Strategic interaction between food proces
sors is modeled as a three-stage game, the tim
ing of which is described in ﬁgure 1. In the
ﬁrst stage, the contract stage, food processor
i writes an observable and non-renegotiable
contract with one or more of her downstream
retailers. Letting a hat on a variable denote a
term speciﬁed in a slotting contract, the con
tract of processor i speciﬁes a wholesale price
for the good ( p̂i ) and a lump-sum transfer

2
When the upstream farm product market is heterogeneous, as
would be the case when farm suppliers produce locationally differ
entiated commodities, the qualitative predictions for the optimal
processor contract are identical to those described here. For the
interest of model clarity, this consideration is suppressed here.

(ŝi ) to be paid to the retailer. The equilibrium
value of this lump-sum transfer is allowed to
emerge without restriction on sign. In the sec
ond stage, the retailer either accepts or re
jects the processor’s contract. If the contract
is accepted, the food processor pays a slot
ting allowance of ŝi to the retailer in return for
the retailer’s agreement to purchase the pro
cessed good at a contracted wholesale price
of p̂i . If the contract is rejected, then no slot
ting allowance is paid and the food proces
sor sells her good to the retailer at the noncontracted wholesale price, piw . In the third
and ﬁnal stage, the food processors compete
in a Cournot oligopsony to procure the farm
product.
Throughout, it is assumed that
(1)

pxf (X ) + xi pxf x (X ) > 0,

for all i

which guarantees the existence and stability of
the farm product equilibrium.3 Condition (1)
ensures that the marginal proﬁt of each proces
sor declines with the procurement level of the
rival processors (i.e., that reaction functions
slope downward).
The model is solved using backward induc
tion. Hence, the analysis begins with the pro
curement stage, followed by the acceptance
and contract stages, respectively. To make the
analysis more transparent, attention is con
ﬁned to the duopsony case.
Suppose the downstream retailer has ac
cepted the contract proposed by food proces
sor i in the procurement stage. In this case, the
objective function of processor i is
(2)

i (xi , X, p̂i , ŝi )
= p̂i f i (xi ) − p f (X )xi − ŝi

i = 1, 2.

In addition, there is also a sunk cost com
ponent that explains the existence of imper
fect competition in the processing sector; how
ever, this plays no role in the analysis and is
3
Expression (1) is sufﬁcient for the Routh-Hurwitz condition to
hold on the Jacobian of equations (3).

consequently omitted. Maximizing (2) with re
spect to xi yields the necessary condition
(3)

f

ii ≡ p̂i f xi (xi ) − p f (X ) − xi px (X ) = 0
i = 1, 2.

The level of farm product use by each ﬁrm and
total industry use of the farm product are ob
tained in the procurement stage by simultane
ously solving equations (3). Denote these solu
tion values by the vectors xic ≡ xic ( p̂1 , p̂2 ), i =
1, 2 and X c ≡ X c ( p̂1 , p̂2 ). Throughout, the convention is to suppress the arguments of xic and
X c except when denoting the evaluation of
these vectors at particular values of the con
tract prices.
Totally differentiating (3) yields the compar
ative statics effects associated with the proces
sor’s choice of p̂i . Noting that iii < 0, iij < 0,
j

(5)

∂ x cj
∂ p̂i

=

  j
f xi xic  ji


< 0.

Next deﬁne the ratio of comparative statics ef
fects in (4) and (5) as
(6)

Max i ( p̂1 , p̂2 , ŝi )
p̂i ,ŝi
 
≡ p̂i f i xic − p f (X c )xic − ŝi
 w
  
s.t.
pi − pˆ i f i xic + ŝi ≥ 0.
The optimal terms in the processor’s con
tract specify that the retailer participation con
straint be met with equality in (7), from which
substitution results in the following uncon
strained problem

j

and  = iii  j j − iij  ji > 0 by (1), the com
parative statics effects are
  j
− f xi xic  j j
∂ xic
(4)
=
>0

∂ p̂i
and

the noncontracted wholesale price through the
payment of a slotting allowance.
In the contract stage, processor i chooses the
terms of the contract so as to maximize proﬁts
in (2) subject to the participation constraint
(7) and the procurement stage solutions above.
Substituting the procurement stage solutions
into (2) and (7), the contracting problem is

∂ x j  c c
x ,X
∂ xi j

∂ x cj ∂ p̂i
≡ c
∂ xi ∂ pˆ i

(8)

f

f

which is negative by the stability condition (1)
and the second-order condition of processor j.
A retailer is willing to accept the slotting
contract proposed by a processor provided he
receives a payment no less than his opportu
nity costs. With a competitive retail industry,
these opportunity costs can be normalized to
zero without loss of generality. Accordingly,
the retailer accepts the contract proposed by
processor i whenever
 w

(7)
pi − pˆ i yi + ŝi ≥ 0,
i= 1, 2.
In (7), processor i compensates the retailer
for any departure of the contracted price from

i= 1, 2.

Note in (8) that only the indirect effect of the
contracted wholesale price remains; the direct
effect of the contract price on the proﬁtability
of processor i is exactly offset by the payment
of the slotting allowance.
Differentiation of (8) with respect to p̂i
yields the necessary condition for a proﬁtmaximizing contract
(9)

px (X c ) + x cj px x (X c )
=


f
f
j
p̂ j f x x x cj − 2 px (X c ) − x cj px x (X c )

Max i ( p̂1 , p̂2 )
p̂i
 
≡ piw f i xic − p f (X c )xic ,



 
 ∂ xic
piw f xi xic − p f (X c )
∂ p̂i
c
f
− xic px (X c ) ∂ X = 0,
∂ p̂i

i = 1, 2.

PROPOSITION 1. The noncooperative Nash
contract equilibrium for food processor i, i =
1, 2, is characterized by
(i) a wholesale price above the noncontracted
price; and
(ii) a positive slotting allowance.
Proof : Let xi∗ ≡ xi ( p̂1∗ , p̂2∗ ), i = 1, 2 denote
the solution to the Nash equilibrium described
by (9). To determine the equilibrium choice of
p̂i∗ , substitute the procurement stage solution
(3) into (9), which gives
 w
  
pi − p̂i∗ f xi xi∗
(10)

∂x 
f
= xi∗ px (X ∗ ) ∂ x j x ∗j , X ∗ < 0
i
where the inequality holds by expression (6).
Hence, the optimal contract of processor i

speciﬁes a wholesale price above the noncontracted wholesale price for the processed
good, p̂i∗ > piw , i = 1, 2.
To compensate the retailer for the higher ex
pense of unit wholesale transactions, the con
tract speciﬁes a positive lump-sum payment.
The optimal level of this slotting allowance, ŝi∗ ,
is identiﬁed by (7) as

  
(11) ŝi∗ = p̂i∗ − piw f i xi∗ > 0, i = 1, 2.
An oligopsonistic processor has an incentive
to pay a slotting allowance to a retailer. By pay
ing a slotting allowance to the retailer, the con
tracted processor is able to negotiate a higher
wholesale price for the good, which, in turn,
shifts the processor’s marginal value product
function outward relative to the rival proces
sor in the farm product market. This shift in
creases the marginal proﬁtability of procuring
the farm product for the contracted processor.
In total, of course, the direct contribution of
the higher wholesale price to the processor’s
proﬁt is exactly offset by the payment of the
slotting allowance. Nonetheless, the outward
shift in the marginal value product function al
ters the set of credible actions for the proces
sor in her oligopsony rivalry for the farm prod
uct. A higher wholesale price purchased with a
compensatory slotting allowance changes the
reaction function of the contracted processor,
thereby allowing her to commit to a higher pro
curement level that increases her oligopsony
rent.
The formal structure of the slotting al
lowance as a precommitment mechanism is
similar to the role of contracts in the verti
cal separation literature (see, e.g., Bonanno
and Vickers, Lin, Coughlin and Wernerfelt,
Shaffer, and Hamilton and Stiegert). A slot
ting allowance that supports a higher whole
sale price is a commitment mechanism that
creates an ex post beneﬁcial expansion in a pro
cessor’s level of farm product procurement.4
Through the use of this mechanism, the non
cooperative oligopsony equilibrium is altered
in favor of the contracted processor.
Because the processors face similar market
incentives, the noncooperative Nash contract
equilibrium is characterized by the multilat
eral use of slotting allowances. Nonetheless,
the noncooperative Nash contract equilibrium
4
It should be noted that if processors compete in prices instead
of in quantities the optimal contract mechanism would involve a
negative slotting allowance (a fee paid from the retailer to the food
processor in exchange for a lower wholesale price). Such behav
ior would not be consistent with observed practice in wholesale
markets.

is jointly suboptimal for the processors. The
combined proﬁt level of the two processors
would be higher if slotting allowances were
reduced below their Nash equilibrium levels.
However, if one processor chose not to pay a
slotting allowance, she could not deter her ri
val from paying a slotting allowance to secure
a higher wholesale price. The noncontracting
processor, in this case, would be worse off than
if she had reciprocated with a slotting contract
of her own.
Producer Surplus Implications
The noncooperative Nash contract equilib
rium has the following implications for pro
ducer surplus.
PROPOSITION 2. At the noncooperative Nash
contract equilibrium:
(i) the joint proﬁtability of food processors
would increase if slotting allowances were
reduced;
(ii) farm surplus would decrease if slotting
allowances were reduced.
Proof : For part (i), note by (7) that the equi
librium level of the slotting allowance in
creases monotonically with the contract price.
Therefore, it is sufﬁcient to show that joint
proﬁtability of food processors would rise, and
farm surplus would fall, in response to a de
crease in the wholesale contract prices. The
joint processor proﬁt function is ( p̂1 , p̂2 ) =
∂i ( pˆ 1 , p̂2 )
 1 ( p̂1 , p̂2 ) +  2 ( p̂1 , p̂2 ). Since
= 0 at
∂ p̂i
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium point, it
follows that


∂ p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
∂ p̂i


 w
 j  ∗  ∂ x cj p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
∗
= p j − p̂ j f x x j
∂ p̂
 ∗ ∗ i
c
∂
x
p̂
,
p̂
f
− x ∗j px (X ∗ ) i 1 2
i = 1, 2.
∂ p̂i
Substituting for (P jw − p̂ ∗j ) f x (x ∗j ) from (10)
and gathering terms yields
 ∗ ∗
 ∗ ∗
(12) ∂ p̂1 , pˆ 2 = x ∗j pxf (X ∗ ) ∂ xi p̂1 , pˆ 2
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i




∂
x
∗
∗
i
× ∂ x xi , X
j


∂ x j  ∗ ∗
× ∂x x j , X
−1
j

i

i = 1, 2

which is negative by (1), (4), and (6). Hence,
a reduction in p̂i∗ , i = 1, 2, increases the joint
proﬁtability of food processors.
For part (ii), farm surplus at the noncooper
ative Nash equilibrium point is given by


G p̂1∗ , p̂2∗ = p f (X ∗ )X ∗ −

X∗

p f (z) dz.
0

It follows that
 ∗ ∗
  ∗ ∗ 
(13) ∂G p̂1 , p̂2 = p f (X ∗ )X ∗ ∂ X p̂1 , p̂2 ,
x
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i
i = 1, 2
which is positive by (1), (4), and (5). Hence, a
reduction in p̂i∗ , i = 1, 2, decreases farm surplus.
Relative to a vertical market system without
slotting allowances, the noncooperative Nash
contract equilibrium is associated with a larger
level of farm surplus. The higher wholesale
price negotiated by each food processor in
the slotting contract increases the total level
of farm product procurement, and this cor
respondingly increases the equilibrium farm
price.
The effect of slotting allowances on (to
tal) producer surplus sums the gain in farm
surplus and the loss in processor surplus.
Figure 2 demonstrates the effect of a uni
lateral slotting contract on producer surplus.

The ﬁgure depicts the special case of linear
farm supply, homogeneous processed prod
ucts, and ﬁxed proportions processing technol
ogy given by f i (xi ) = xi , for i = 1, 2. In the ﬁgf,n
f,n
f,c
ure, p R (x1n ) = p R (X n − x2n ) and p R (x1c ) =
f,c
p R (X c − x2c ) denote the (inverse) residual
farm supply function facing processor 1 in
the noncontracted and contracted case, respec
tively. The residual supply function is obtained
in each case by shifting the farm supply func
tion to the left (by either x2n or x2c units). The
slotting contract of processor 1 decreases the
equilibrium level of farm product procurement
by processor 2 in (5), which is represented in
the ﬁgure by the outward shift in residual sup
ply in the contracted case. The marginal outlay
schedule corresponding to each residual farm
supply function deﬁnes processor 1’s reaction
function in each case, and this is denoted in the
ﬁgure by R1n (x2n ) in the noncontracted case and
by R1c (x2c ) in the contracted case.
Consider, ﬁrst, the benchmark social opti
mum. This situation is depicted by the surplusmaximizing market quantity, X s , which is
where the farm supply function, p f (X ),
equates with the noncontracted wholesale
product price of the homogeneous processed
good, p w . Next, consider the baseline oligop
sony outcome in the noncontracted case. With
out a slotting contract, the equilibrium level of
farm product use for processor 1, x10 , is deter
mined by the intersection of the noncontracted

Figure 2. Residual farm supply and the producer surplus implications of slotting allowances

marginal outlay schedule, R1n (x2n ), with the
wholesale price, p w . At this quantity, the equi
librium farm price is identiﬁed by the residual
f,n
supply function as p f (X 0 ) = p R (x10 ), which
results in a total level of farm product procure
ment of X 0 .
Now consider the outcome under a slotting
allowance. A slotting contract by processor 1
results in the two effects shown in the ﬁgure:
(a) processor 1’s contract speciﬁes a relatively
higher wholesale price, p̂1∗ > p w ; and (b) the
higher wholesale price, in turn, shifts processor
1’s reaction function outward from R1n (x2n ) to
R1c (x2c ). The equilibrium level of farm product
use by processor 1 in the contracted case, x1∗ , is
now determined by the intersection of R1c (x2c )
with the contract price, p̂1∗ , which results in an
f,c
equilibrium farm price of p f (X ∗ ) = p R (x1∗ )
and a total level of farm product procurement
given by X ∗ . Ignoring distributional consider
ations, the total increase in producer surplus
(farmers plus food processors) under the slot
ting allowance is represented by the shaded
region of the ﬁgure.
A unilateral slotting allowance generally in
creases producer surplus in the food system.
Nonetheless, it is possible for a unilateral slot
ting allowance to decrease producer surplus
under circumstances in which the processing
technology differs across ﬁrms. To see this, sup
pose processor 2 is the more cost-efﬁcient food
processor in the sense that f x2 (x̄) > f x1 (x̄) and
f x2x (x̄) ≥ f x1x (x̄) for all x̄. In this case, a slotting
contract by processor 1 produces two coun
tervailing effects on producer surplus. The to
tal procurement level of the farm product in
creases, which increases producer surplus, but,
at the same time, production in the process
ing sector is redistributed from the low-cost
processor to the relatively high-cost proces
sor, which reduces allocative efﬁciency. In the
case depicted in ﬁgure 2, this latter redistribu
tive effect has no welfare consequence because
the processors are assumed to have symmetric,
ﬁxed proportions processing technology. If the
food processors have asymmetric costs, then
it is conceivable that a unilateral slotting al
lowance by the relatively cost-inefﬁcient pro
cessor reduces total producer surplus.
Of course, the noncooperative Nash con
tract equilibrium is characterized by multi
lateral slotting allowances. Under multilateral
slotting allowances, allocative efﬁciency in the
processing sector is reduced by the contract
of the relatively cost-inefﬁcient processor, but
increased by the contract of the relatively cost-

efﬁcient processor. In equilibrium, the com
bined effect of slotting allowances on alloca
tive efﬁciency is of second-order signiﬁcance in
the producer surplus calculation. To clarify the
effect of slotting allowances on producer sur
plus in the noncooperative Nash contract equi
librium, it is helpful to suppress the offsetting
effects of the slotting contracts on allocative
efﬁciency. To do this, consider the case of sym
metric food processors, f i (·) = f (·), i = 1, 2.
PROPOSITION 3. At the noncooperative Nash
contract equilibrium with symmetric food pro
cessors, the combined producer surplus of
farmers and food processors would fall if slot
ting allowances were reduced.
Proof : Producer surplus in the vertical sys
tem is S( p̂1 , p̂2 ) = ( p̂1 , p̂2 ) + G( p̂1 , p̂2 ). At
the noncooperative Nash equilibrium point,
the effect of a change in the wholesale price
of processor i on producer surplus is given by
the sum of effects in (12) and (13). Combining
these expressions yields


 ∗ ∗
∂ S p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
f
∗ ∂ x i p̂1 , p̂2
= px (X )
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i


∂ x j  ∗ ∗
× xi∗ 1 +
xj, X
∂ xi

∂x 
+ x ∗j ∂ x j x ∗j , X ∗
i


∂ xi  ∗ ∗ 
× 1+
x ,X
∂x j i
Next, let xi∗ = x ∗ , i = 1, 2, denote the level of
farm product procurement by each proces
sor in a symmetric oligopsony conﬁguration,
∂x
and notice that ∂∂ xxij (xi∗ , X ∗ ) = ∂ xij (x ∗j , X ∗ ) in the
symmetric case. This implies


 ∗ ∗
∂ S p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
∗ f
∗ ∂ x i p̂1 , p̂2
= x px (X )
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i


 2
∂x 
× 1 + ∂ x j x ∗j , X ∗
i

which is positive by (4).
Slotting allowances increase producer sur
plus in the food system. Relative to the case
of wholesale grocery transactions that do not
involve slotting allowances, the joint proﬁtabil
ity of food processors is lower, but the level of
farm surplus is higher and more than compen
sates for the loss in processor surplus.

The market equilibrium that supports each
of the results above is subgame perfect.
Nonetheless, in dynamic processor games it is
possible that trigger strategies could be em
ployed to support an outcome that increases
processor proﬁts. The collusive outcome can be
analyzed as follows. Let xim = xi ( p̂1m , p̂2m ), i =
1, 2, denote the joint proﬁt-maximizing pro
curement levels of the farm product, where
p̂im are the joint proﬁt-maximizing wholesale
prices. The solution to the cooperative proﬁt
maximization problem provides the following
result.
PROPOSITION 4. The cooperative solution that
maximizes joint processor proﬁt is character
ized by negative slotting allowances.
Proof : At the jointly optimal solution,
∂ ( p̂1m , p̂2m )
= 0, i = 1, 2, where
∂ p̂i
∂ ( p̂1 , p̂2 )
∂ 1 ( p̂1 , p̂2 )
=
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i
∂ 2 ( p̂1 , p̂2 )
+
.
∂ p̂i
Making use of (3), the joint optimum simulta
neously solves
(14)



  
 ∂ x1c
p1w − pˆ 1 f x1 x1c − x1c pxf (X c )
∂ p̂1
 w
 2 c

c f
+ p2 − p̂2 f x x2 − x2 px (X c )
×

∂ x2c
=0
∂ p̂1

and
(15)



  
 ∂ x1c
p1w − p̂1 f x1 x1c − x1c pxf (X c )
∂ p̂2

  

+ p2w − p̂2 f x2 x2c − x2c pxf (X c )
×

∂ x2c
= 0.
∂ p̂2

By inspection of (14) and (15), the unique so
lution to this problem is
piw − p̂im =

f

xim px (X m )
  >0
f xi xim
for i = 1, 2.

Thus, the joint proﬁt-maximizing contract
prices are set below the noncontracted whole
sale prices. Accordingly, the levels of the slot

ting fees that maximize joint processor proﬁt
follow from (7) as
 m
i
m
m f
m f xi
ŝi = −xi px (X ) i  m  < 0
f x xi
for i = 1, 2.
In a collusive situation, the processors maxi
mize joint proﬁt by establishing contract terms
with retailers that stipulate negative slotting
allowances in exchange for lower wholesale
prices. A wholesale price reduction shifts the
marginal value product function downward
for each processor in the farm product mar
ket, which reduces procurement levels and de
creases farm prices to the monopsony level
that maximizes joint processor proﬁt. Con
sistent with this outcome, it is interesting to
note that, in some cases, large food processors
have made public claims not to pay slotting
allowances.5
Extension to the Retail Market
Thus far, the analysis has suppressed an im
portant element of the food system: the mar
ket contact between a grocery retailer and his
consumers. The goal of this section is to for
mally connect the model to the downstream
retail market. The analysis proceeds in two
portions. In the ﬁrst portion, a single myopic
retailer is considered who does not antici
pate the effect of the slotting allowance on
retail prices. This situation produces an equiv
alent contracting environment to that which
obtained previously under perfect retail com
petition. The noncooperative Nash contract
equilibrium is extended in this framework to
examine the effect of slotting allowances on re
tail prices and consumer welfare. In the second
portion, nonmyopic retailer behavior is consid
ered and conditions are derived under which
processor-motivated slotting allowances con
tinue to emerge in the noncooperative Nash
contract equilibrium.
The retail sector is framed in a highly stylized
fashion. A single grocery retailer purchases a
set of differentiated wholesale products, pro
vides shelf space for them, and then sells them
to consumers in a retail market. Let pir (Y ) de
note the inverse demand for product i in the
retail market, where Y is a vector of all retail
goods, some of which may be substitutes and
5

A notable example is Proctor & Gamble.

some of which may be complements to pro
cessed good i. A nonempty subset of Y con
tains processed goods produced by rival food
processors that compete to procure a farm
product in an oligopsony market common to
processor i. Suppose for analytic convenience
that the retailer stocks a single product for
each of two processors, so that the vector of
retail goods can be written as Y = (y1 , y2 ). All
other arguments that inﬂuence retail prices are
suppressed.
It is interesting to note that the possibility
exists for oligopsony food processors to pur
chase a homogeneous farm product in a com
mon upstream market, but sell complementary
processed goods in the wholesale market (e.g.,
corn tortillas and margarine). In the analysis
to follow, attention is centered on the more
common case in which food processors pro
duce and sell differentiated substitute goods.6
The retail (inverse) demand functions for
processed products are assumed to be differ
entiable and satisfy
(16)

∂ pir (Y )
∂ pir (Y )
<
0,
∂ yi
∂ y j < 0, and
 r
  r

 ∂ p (Y )   ∂ p (Y ) 
 i
≥ i

 ∂ yi   ∂ y j  .

These conditions, respectively, ensure that in
verse demand for each retail good slopes
downward, that the products are substitutes,
and that, on the margin, a change in a pro
cessor’s own-quantity has a (at least weakly)
greater effect on the price of her retail good
than a change in the rival processor’s quantity.
This latter condition in (16) is met with equal
ity in the case of homogeneous retail products;
otherwise, the inequality holds strictly.
To establish the effect of a slotting allowance
by food processor i on retail prices, assume the
retailer does not hold an inventory. In this case,
the quantity vector that clears the retail mar
ket also clears the farm product market. Let
Y c = ( f i (xic ), f j (x cj )) denote this retail quan
tity vector. Accordingly, the retail price effects
of a slotting allowance by processor i are
(17)

∂ pr (Y c )   ∂ xic
∂ pir (Y c )
= i c f xi xic
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i
∂ yi
c
c
r
∂ p (Y ) j   ∂ x j
+ i c f x x cj
<0
∂ p̂i
∂yj

6
The qualitative predictions of the model are similar for the
case in which retailers produce complementary goods. Details are
available from the author upon request.

and
(18)

∂ prj (Y c ) i  c  ∂ xic
∂ prj (Y c )
=
f x xi
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i
∂ yic
r
c
∂ p (Y ) j   ∂ x cj
+ j c f x x cj
∂ p̂i
∂yj

in markets i and j, respectively. Expressions
(17) and (18) decompose the retail price ef
fect for each good into own- and cross-effects
on (inverse) demand weighted by the magni
tudes of the quantity changes. In (17), the ﬁrst
term is the direct effect of processor i’s slotting
contract on the retail price of her own pro
cessed good, which is negative by (4) and (16).
The second term is the indirect effect of pro
cessor i’s slotting contract on her retail price
that obtains from the output reduction of ri
val processor j. This term is positive because
goods i and j are substitutes; however, given
the relative magnitude of the output effects in
(4) and (5), the indirect effect is guaranteed to
be smaller in magnitude than the direct effect
by (16). This implies that the sum of effects in
(17) is negative. In (18), a slotting allowance by
processor i has two effects on the retail price
of rival good j: processor i’s contract increases
the output of processor i, which has a negative
cross-effect on the price of good j, but pro
cessor i’s contract also reduces the output of
processor j, which has a positive (direct) effect
on the price of good j. The sum of these effects
takes an ambiguous sign because the quantity
adjustment by processor i in response to her
slotting allowance is larger (in absolute value)
than the quantity adjustment of processor j.
For homogeneous processed goods, a slotting
allowance by processor i unambiguously de
creases the retail price. For sufﬁciently differ
entiated processed goods, the retail price of
good j increases in response to a slotting al
lowance by processor i.
The retail price effect in (17) has two im
mediate implications that deserve further em
phasis. First, a slotting contract by processor i
decreases the retail margin on processed good
i from the noncontracted level. A slotting con
tract that increases the wholesale price of pro
cessor i above the noncontracted level de
creases the retail price of good i in (17), and
this squeezes the retail margin from both sides.
Second, the consumer surplus implication of a
slotting allowance is immediate from (17). A
contract that increases the wholesale price of
processed good i lowers the retail price con
sumers pay for good i, which unambiguously

increases consumer surplus in the market for
good i.
A unilateral slotting contract by processor
i inﬂuences the retail price of both processed
goods. This implies that the total effect on con
sumer utility is determined jointly by the price
effects in (17) and (18). To construct a utilitybased measure for these effects, suppose dif
ferences across individual consumers are lim
ited to those which permit equilibrium prices
and outputs to be determined by an aggregate
utility function. Let V (y1∗ ( p̂1 , p̂2 ), y2∗ ( p̂1 , p̂2 ))
denote the corresponding indirect utility func
tion. Next, evaluate this function at the nonco
operative Nash equilibrium point and perturb
the contract price of processor i. Making use
of the envelope theorem, this gives


∂ V p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
(19)
∂ p̂i

∂ prj (Y ∗ )
∂ pr (Y ∗ )
= −∗ yi∗ i
+ y ∗j
,
∂ p̂i
∂ p̂i
i = 1, 2
where ∗ > 0 is the marginal utility of income.
Equation (19) measures the change in con
sumer welfare in terms of the equivalent vari
ation. If the quantity-weighted sum of price
effects in the square brackets of (19) is posi
tive, then a slotting contract that increases the
wholesale price of processed good i increases
the expenditure level necessary to procure the
original consumption bundle. Utility decreases
in this case by implication.
The qualitative effect of a unilateral slot
ting contract on consumer welfare depends on
the degree of product differentiation in the re
tail market. In the case of homogeneous re
tail products, both price effects are negative
in (19) and it follows that consumer welfare
unambiguously increases in response to a slot
ting allowance by processor i. In the case of
differentiated retail products, the sum of price
effects in (19) is ambiguous and it is conceiv
able that a unilateral slotting contract by pro
cessor i reduces consumer welfare. Such a per
verse outcome for consumer welfare can only
occur, however, when the retail products are
sufﬁciently differentiated and when the uni
lateral slotting contract is negotiated for the
processed good which is relatively less desir
able in consumption.
Under multilateral contracts, slotting al
lowances have clear implications for consumer
welfare under symmetric market conditions.
To see this, consider the case in which the food

processors have identical production technol
ogy and produce processed goods that are sym
metric substitutes in the sense of Dixit and
Stiglitz.7
PROPOSITION 5. At a noncooperative Nash
contract equilibrium with symmetric food pro
cessors, consumer welfare would decrease if
slotting allowances were reduced.
Proof : Let xi∗ = x ∗ , and yi∗ = y ∗ , i = 1, 2, de
note the equilibrium level of farm product
use and output by each processor in a sym
metric market conﬁguration. Making use of
these conditions and the symmetry of the re
tail price effects, ∂ pir (Y ∗ )/∂ yi = ∂ prj (Y ∗ )/∂ y j
and ∂ pir (Y ∗ )/∂ y j = ∂ prj (Y ∗ )/∂ yi , substitution
of (17) and (18) into (19) yields
(20)



∂ V p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
∂ p̂i



∂ xi∗ p̂1∗ , p̂2∗
∂ p̂i∗
 r ∗

∂ pi (Y ) ∂ pir (Y ∗ )
×
+
∂ yi
∂yj


∂ x j  ∗ ∗
× 1+
xj, X
> 0,
∂ xi

= −∗ y ∗ f xi (x ∗ )

i = 1, 2
where the inequality holds by (1), (4), and (6).
Slotting allowances reduce retail prices and in
crease consumer welfare.
Thus far, the retailer has been assumed to
be myopic. Under nonmyopic retailer behav
ior, it remains to be demonstrated that a set
of retail market conditions exist in which slot
ting allowances emerge in the noncooperative
Nash contract equilibrium. To assess the type
of retail market conditions that support slot
ting allowances as an equilibrium outcome, it
is sufﬁcient to identify the circumstances un
der which processor incentives exist to increase
wholesale prices from their noncontracted lev
els in a two-part tariff structure.
When the retailer is not myopic, slotting al
lowances must compensate the retailer for the
effect of the contracted wholesale prices on
7
Retail goods in the symmetric substitutes model are allowed
to be highly differentiated, but are viewed to be equally desir
able to consumers at equal retail prices. This would be the case,
for example, when consumers are uniformly distributed in the
characteristic-space that differentiates the two goods.

the equilibrium retail prices. The level of com
pensation necessary to induce the retailer to
accept a contract depends on various features
that characterize the solution to the retailer’s
problem. The nature of the problem facing a
multi-product retailer is interesting and impor
tant in its own right; however, to maintain the
present focus on food processor incentives, the
retailer’s problem is framed with a minimal
amount of structural detail.
Consider a retailer who faces constant
marginal cost of $c per unit for each good that
is stocked on his shelf. The retailer incurs posi
tive ﬁxed costs for providing shelf space to the
processed goods. Suppose a solution exists to
the retailer’s problem. At an initial position
without slotting contracts, this solution can be
characterized by an arbitrary level of equilib
rium retail proﬁt on each good denoted by


(21) Mi0 ≡ ir yi0 , Y 0 , piw


= pir (Y 0 ) − piw yi0 ,
i = 1, 2
where Mi0 is the retailer’s marketing return
(or quasi-rent) on processed good i and Y 0 =
(y10 , y20 ) is the vector of equilibrium retail quan
tities that coincides with the initial noncon
tracted wholesale prices, p̂i = piw and ŝi = 0,
i = 1, 2. Marginal cost, which is constant, can
be subsumed into retail demand without loss
of generality.
The retail market outcome in (21) can be
given several interpretations. For example, the
retailer’s problem might be speciﬁed in the
context of a Ramsey optimization problem, in
which case the sum of marketing returns across
products would recover supermarket ﬁxed
costs at retail prices that minimize deadweight
loss (see, e.g., Baumol and Bradford). Alterna
tively, the retailer’s problem might be one of
multi-product retail monopoly (or oligopoly),
in which case the retail margin on each product
would be set to equalize marginal marketing
returns across products.
Given the solution to the retailer’s problem
(21), suppose the retailer is willing to accept
a contract proposed by processor i whenever
the slotting allowance provides a return in the
retail market that (at least weakly) exceeds his
existing marketing return on processed good
i.8 That is, the retailer accepts processor i’s con
8
This speciﬁcation of the retailer participation constraint, which
compensates the retailer only for the effect of a slotting allowance
on the marketing return of retail good i, and not for its indirect
effect on the marketing return of retail good j, might be thought

tract whenever
 r c

(22)
pi (Y ) − p̂i yic + ŝi ≥ Mi0 ,

i = 1, 2

and otherwise rejects it.
Processor i, in turn, chooses the terms of her
slotting contract to maximize proﬁts in (2) sub
ject to the participation constraint (22) and the
procurement stage solutions. Speciﬁcally, the
contracting problem facing processor i is
 
Max p̂i f i xic − p f (X c )xic − ŝi
p̂i ,ŝi
 r c
  
s.t.
pi (Y ) − p̂i f i xic + ŝi


− pir (Y 0 ) − piw yi0 ≥ 0.
Noting that the optimal processor contract
meets the participation constraint with equal
ity, this expression can be differentiated with
respect to p̂i to obtain
(23)

di ( p̂1 , p̂2 )
d p̂i
  ∂ pir (Y c )
= f i xic
∂ p̂i
 r i  c
 ∂ xic
+ pi f x xi − p f (X c )
∂ p̂i
c
∂
X
− xic pxf (X c )
,
i = 1, 2.
∂ p̂i

A contract that speciﬁes a positive slotting al
lowance in exchange for a higher wholesale
price increases the proﬁt of processor i when
ever the sum of the three terms in expres
sion (23) is positive. The retail market features
that support slotting allowances as a processormotivated outcome can be summarized from
this equation as follows.
PROPOSITION 6. A food processor’s incentive
to pay a slotting allowance increases with:
(i) the elasticity of retail demand for her
product;
(ii) the size of the retail margin on her
product;
(iii) the degree of oligopsony power in the farm
product market.
of as “fend-for-yourself” marketing. In a setting of multilateral
contracts, each processor simultaneously writes a slotting contract
to compensate the retailer for the marketing return on her own
product. Alternatively, one could consider a retailer that demands
“full compensation” from processor i for the effect of her slotting
allowance on the marketing return on both retail goods i and j. This
view may accord well in a setting of unilateral contracts. Details in
the “full compensation” case are available from the author upon
request.

Proof : Substituting the procurement stage so
lutions (3) into (23) and evaluating this expres
sion at the noncontracted wholesale price po
sition (i.e., xi = xi0 ,yi = yi0 , p̂i0 = piw , and ŝi0 =
0), processor i has an incentive to pay a positive
slotting allowance whenever
(24)

yi0


∂ pir (Y 0 )  r 0
+ pi (Y ) − piw
∂ p̂i


 0  ∂ xic p̂10 , p̂20
i
× f x xi
∂ p̂i


∂ x cj p̂10 , p̂20
0 f
0
− xi px (X )
> 0.
∂ p̂i

The ﬁrst term in (24) is the retail price effect
of processor i’s slotting allowance. This term is
negative by (17). A slotting contract by proces
sor i reduces the retail price of good i, which
increases the level of compensation she must
pay in the lump-sum component to meet the
retailer participation constraint (22). The re
tail price effect reduces the proﬁtability of the
contract to processor i in proportion to the ini
tial quantity sold in the retail market, yi0 . In
terms of the retail demand elasticity, the crosseffect of a quantity change on the price of good
i is bounded by the own-effect in (16) and it
follows that processor i’s incentive to propose
a slotting allowance increases with the mag
nitude of the (direct) elasticity of demand for
retail good i.
The second term is the retail margin effect.
This term is positive. A slotting contract by pro
cessor i increases the output of good i, which
increases the retailer’s rent in proportion to
the size of the existing retail margin. The in
crease in retail rent correspondingly reduces
the compensation necessary to meet the partic
ipation constraint in (22) and makes a slotting
allowance more attractive for processor i.
The ﬁnal term in (24) is the oligopsony in
centive for a slotting allowance. A slotting al
lowance by processor i reduces the procure
ment level of the rival processor in the farm
product market, which shifts oligopsony rent
to ﬁrm i. This term is positive and has a magni
tude that increases as the farm supply function
becomes more inelastic.
Discussion and Empirical Implications
Is the observed pattern of the slotting al
lowances in the wholesale grocery market con
sistent with the contract design problem of
food processing ﬁrms? This section presents

and interprets some underlying characteristics
and general trends in the U.S. food system un
der the lens of the theory.
Several trends in the U.S. food system are
consistent with favorable changes in proces
sor incentives at the time slotting allowances
emerged in 1984. In the 1961–86 period,
Sullivan ﬁnds that the gross retail margin
across all grocery products increased in U.S.
supermarkets. To the extent that retail mar
gins also increased for the subset of processed
goods, this would increase processor incentives
for slotting allowances. It is also widely recog
nized that the period surrounding the emer
gence of slotting allowances was characterized
by considerable technological change in the
farm sector. Technological change in the farm
sector tends to reduce variable costs and in
crease ﬁxed costs (e.g., by replacing farm labor
with capital equipment), so that the adoption
of modern technology in this period may have
made farm supply functions less elastic and in
creased oligopsony power.9 Finally, this period
also coincides with the trend toward highly dif
ferentiated retail products in the food system.
Product differentiation in the retail food mar
ket provides consumers with a more reﬁned set
of product choices, which is likely to increase
the elasticity of retail demand facing individ
ual processed goods. These trends in the food
system are consistent with an increase in pro
cessor incentives for slotting allowances.
The empirical footprint of a slotting al
lowance under food processor incentives dif
fers in some important ways from that which
would be left under an alternative theory. A
unique feature of the present model is that
it generates potentially refutable hypotheses
regarding the subset of products for which
processor incentives emerge for two-part tar
iffs. Two observations follow immediately from
this point. First, a necessary condition for a
processor incentive to exist is a degree of multimarket contact at the upstream and wholesale
levels of the food system. A farmer who sells a
farm product directly to a retailer in the whole
sale market can have no incentive of this form.
This observation provides a testable prediction
to explain why slotting allowances are com
mon in processed product categories, but not in
other product categories such as fresh produce
and in-store bakery products where there is no
element of market intermediation between the
farm product and wholesale markets. Second,
9
This point was ﬁrst made by Just and Chern regarding the adop
tion of the mechanized tomato harvester in California.
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Figure 3. Annual grocery sales in billions of 1982–84 dollars
given that this necessary condition is met, the
model outlines a number of sufﬁcient condi
tions for food processor incentives to exist. For
example, a slotting contract is most attractive
in vertical markets with a high degree of retail
competition and a large degree of oligopsony
power in the farm product market.
Is the theory of processor-driven slotting al
lowances consistent with observed practices
in the supermarket? Unfortunately, negotia
tions for slotting allowances are often made
orally and in private; hence public data on
individual transactions are virtually nonexis
tent. Nonetheless, the theory developed here
suggests an interpretation of aggregate super
market data based on several industry trends.
In particular, critical differences between the
present theory and existing models of slotting
allowances are stratiﬁed in two dimensions of
the data: (a) through time trends in the level
of supermarket prices, quantities and proﬁts,
and (b) through cross-sectional comparisons
of gross retail margins in product categories
with and without slotting allowances.
The retail market features that develop
through processor incentives for slotting al
lowances contrast sharply with the proﬁle that
emerges when retailers employ two-part tar
iffs to exercise market power. In Shaffer’s the
ory of retailer-mandated fees, for instance, the
lens on slotting allowances is reversed in the

sense that food processors (and not retailers)
are driven down to their reservation proﬁt
levels by the contracts. Positive slotting al
lowances and higher wholesale prices obtain
identically under forces of retail market power;
however, the implication of the fees for mar
ket performance is exactly opposite to that
described here.10 Under retail oligopoly, slot
ting allowances increase retailer proﬁt only to
the extent that higher wholesale prices support
higher retail prices, and this implies that the
total quantity of retail grocery sales must de
crease. It is, therefore, possible to distinguish
slotting allowances that emerge through food
processor incentives from the fees driven by
noncompetitive retailer motivations by exam
ining the effect of slotting allowances on retail
grocery sales, prices, and proﬁts.
Figure 3 depicts annual U.S. grocery sales in
the 1966–2000 period for all grocery stores and
for supermarkets (in 1982–84 dollars adjusted
10
It is a somewhat striking result that a retailer oligopoly model
with strategic complements results in a qualitatively similar con
tract outcome as a processor oligopsony model with strategic sub
stitutes. This result obtains because the slope of the reaction func
tions, in each case, takes the opposite sign as the slope of the func
tion through which market power is derived (i.e., either demand
or supply). The qualitative implications of slotting allowances for
welfare are opposing in the two models, however; and this is be
cause the effect of a higher wholesale price on market quantity
is determined only by whether the equilibrium market quantity is
bid along a supply function or a demand function.

by the food-at-home index). The ﬁgure shows
that annual grocery sales, both in the U.S. gro
cery market and in U.S. supermarkets, have in
creased in a fairly stable manner over the pe
riod in which slotting allowances emerged.11
This increase in sales has matched the general
trend in U.S. resident population over the pe
riod: grocery and supermarket sales increased
by 32.8% and 37.2%, respectively, compared
with a growth rate of 34.2% in the U.S. resident
population. The stability of the trends in retail
sales provides some indication that slotting al
lowances have not decreased the quantity of
retail grocery transactions.
Table 1 compares price changes in the con
sumer price index (CPI) to price trends for
all food and food-at-home (FAH) consump
tion, which excludes food sold in restaurant
establishments. Notice that the food-at-home
index has not increased relative to the CPI and
overall food index in the period. Slotting al
lowances do not appear to have increased re
tail grocery prices.
There is also evidence that proﬁt levels in
creased in the food processing sector relative
to the retail grocery sector over the period
in which slotting allowances emerged. In the
1961–91 period, Messinger and Narasimhan
ﬁnd that retail proﬁts did not increase, whereas
food manufacturer proﬁts did not decrease in
the 1980s relative to earlier periods in their
sample.
Overall, the evidence does not seem to sup
port the premise that slotting allowances de
rive from retailer market power. The trends
in retail prices, quantities, and proﬁts pro
vide some indirect evidence that slotting
allowances are not motivated by retailer
market power. There is also some direct evi
dence. White, Troy, and Gerlich ﬁnd slotting
allowances to occur predominantly in product
categories that are characterized by a large de
gree of retail competition. A competitive retail
market, moreover, would favor processor in
centives for slotting allowances.
Slotting allowances that emerge through
forces of food processor market power
produce retail market features that differ
markedly from those obtained through com
petitive market forces. This is because the slot
ting allowance, itself, serves as a signaling or

11
The two discontinuities in the supermarket sales data reﬂect
upward revisions in the nominal volume that deﬁned a supermar
ket. In 1973, the minimum sales volume required to be classiﬁed
as a supermarket increased from $0.5 million to $1 million, and, in
1981, it increased from $1 million to $2 million.

Table 1.
Indexes

The CPI, Food, and Food-at-Home

Year

CPI

Food

FAH

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000

100.0
103.1
107.4
113.3
119.8
125.0
129.0
137.0
152.2
166.0
175.6
187.0
201.2
224.1
254.3
280.6
297.8
307.4
320.7
332.1
338.3
350.6
365.1
383.0
403.4
420.4
433.0
446.0
457.4
470.4
484.3
495.4
503.1
514.2
531.5

100.0
100.9
104.4
109.8
116.0
119.5
124.6
142.6
163.0
176.9
182.2
193.8
213.0
236.4
256.8
276.9
288.2
294.1
305.3
312.4
322.5
335.8
349.7
370.1
391.7
403.3
408.0
416.9
426.9
439.1
453.6
465.4
475.4
485.5
496.4

100.0
99.7
103.1
108.0
113.4
116.2
121.3
141.2
162.2
175.6
179.3
189.8
209.7
232.4
251.1
269.3
278.7
281.5
292.0
296.3
304.8
317.9
331.3
352.8
375.9
385.8
388.6
398.0
409.4
422.7
438.4
449.1
457.7
466.5
477.0

Notes: Data are from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.
bls.gov/data/sa.htm). All price indexes are for all urban consumers; the U.S.
city average is in 1966 dollars. CPI = the consumer price index. Food = the
food index, including food at home. FAH = the food-at-home index.

screening device under asymmetric informa
tion, whereas, under processor market power,
the lump-sum payment plays only an indirect
role in supporting a higher wholesale price. It
follows that evidence to differentiate slotting
allowances that emerge through processor in
centives from the fees that arise through com
petitive market forces can be found by examin
ing changes in the dynamic proﬁle of wholesale
grocery prices. A slotting contract motivated
by processor market power must narrow the
gross retail margin in contracted categories of
the supermarket by (17).
Sullivan examines a composite measure of
the gross retail margin across all supermarket
products and argues that the nondecreasing

gross retail margin identiﬁed over the 1961–86
period supports the competitive market view.
There are at least three reasons why this is
not the case. First, the 1961–86 period largely
preceded the emergence of slotting allowances
in 1984. Indeed, an increase in the gross re
tail margin over this period would provide
precisely the type of change in processor in
centives that could explain the appearance of
slotting allowances. Second, this period is char
acterized by a rapid increase in the number
of grocery products stocked. For example, be
tween 1978 and 1987, A. C. Nielsen reports a
34.4% increase in the number of dry grocery
items stocked in grocery stores and numer
ous trade articles report similarly high growth
rates in the number of frozen and refrigerated
items stocked in supermarkets in the 1980s.
Given the relatively capital-intensive nature of
frozen and refrigerated products, this is likely
to have substantially increased retailer ﬁxed
costs. In the absence of lump-sum transfers, an
increase in retailer ﬁxed costs would tend to in
crease the gross retail margin across supermar
ket products, and, for this reason, evidence in
time series data on the (net) change in the gross
retail margin is largely uninformative. Third,
the gross retail margin across all supermarket
products is a measure that aggregates over a

large set of product categories, only a subset
of which employ slotting allowances. To de
rive evidence on the linkage between slotting
allowances and gross retail margins for this
subset of products, cross-sectional data are
required.
Table 2 compares gross retail margins for
a selection of products in which the magni
tudes of slotting allowances are known. Notice
that the refrigerated/frozen-foods category has
higher slotting fees than the candy/snacks cat
egory, but that the retail margins for the
refrigerated/frozen-foods category are notably
smaller. Higher, still, is the gross retail mar
gin for the in-store bakery category, a prod
uct category with neither slotting allowances
nor the element of market intermediation
necessary to support them under oligopsony
incentives.
A necessary condition for slotting al
lowances to emerge through oligopsony mar
ket power is intermediation between the farm
product market and the wholesale grocery
market. For this reason, it is useful to compare
trends in gross retail margins between pro
cessed and nonprocessed product categories of
the supermarket in time series data. Figure 4
compares the relative trends in the gross retail
margins for fresh and frozen vegetables over
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Figure 4. Percent change in gross retail margins for fresh and frozen vegetables, 1978–2000

Table 2.

Sample Slotting Allowances and Gross Retail Margins, 1997

Product Category

Slotting
Allowance

Refrigerated and Frozen Foods

$40,000

Candy/Snacks

$7,000

In-store Bakery

None

Subcategory
Dairy products
Frozen foods
Crackers, cookies, biscuits
Sweet goods
Chewing gum

Gross Retail
Margin (percent)
29.8
31.7
33.9
39.2
35.3
56.3

Source: Desiraju.
Note: Slotting allowances are reported on a per item per store basis.

the 1978–2000 period.12 The gross retail mar
gin in each product category is taken to be the
difference between the CPI and producer price
index (PPI), where the relative difference in
the producer and consumer price for each se
ries is normalized to zero in 1978. Notice that
the gross retail margin for fresh vegetables in
creased substantially relative to that for frozen
vegetables in the period. This is consistent with
a central prediction of the model that slotting
allowances motivated by oligopsony market
power lead to a narrowing of the gross retail
margin on processed food products relative to
nonintermediated farm commodities.
Concluding Remarks
This article has demonstrated that slotting al
lowances may be motivated, not by grocery re
tailers who wish to receive the fees, but by food
processors who wish to pay them. The central
observation that supported this result is that a
slotting allowance paid in exchange for a retail
concession that induces an upward shift in a
food processor’s marginal value product func
tion enables the processor to obtain greater
oligopsony rent in the farm product market.
The retail concession acquired through a
slotting allowance was formally modeled as
a higher wholesale price. While this form of
retailer concession corresponds with an im
portant contract form observed in wholesale
grocery transactions—a ﬁxed price contract—
slotting allowances, in general, need not be
structured in this form. A slotting allowance
may also be paid by a food processor in ex
change for a variety of other retail concessions,
such as to acquire a relatively more desirable
shelf space position in the supermarket (e.g.,
at basket level on the corner of an aisle) or to
12
The gross retail margin for frozen vegetables is used to proxy
that for all processed vegetables. Prior to 1997, the U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics does not report price data on canned vegetables
nor on all processed vegetables.

exclude rival processors from obtaining shelf
space through an exclusive territory arrange
ment. Nonetheless, to the extent that a retail
concession of any form induces an outward
shift in the marginal value product function of
the contracted processor, qualitatively similar
results to those obtained here would continue
to arise.
Slotting allowances that derive from oligop
sony market power were found to have pos
itive implications for economic surplus at all
stages of the food system. The noncoopera
tive Nash contract equilibrium of the model
was shown to involve multilateral slotting al
lowances by food processors that raise farm
surplus, increase the combined surplus of farm
ers, processors, and retailers, and improve con
sumer welfare.
The model results suggest some interesting
possibilities for future research into the nature
of wholesale grocery transactions. Along the
oretical lines, considerable research is needed
to develop a greater conceptual understand
ing of the forces at work in the highly differ
entiated retail grocery sector. In the case of
slotting allowances, there is little evidence of
the practice at volume retailers like Wal-Mart
and Costco, which suggests a potential link
may exist between wholesale pricing arrange
ments and inventory management practices at
the retail level. In general, the marketing en
vironment of multiproduct food retailers is a
much-understudied area, particularly in non
competitive contexts, and adding structural
detail to this sector in vertical models may
provide important insights into explaining the
multitude of market practices that continue
to materialize in an increasingly sophisticated
food system.
Further empirical research is needed to de
velop an adequate understanding of slotting
allowances. This article has outlined several
possibilities in this direction by identifying
several features that distinguish slotting al
lowances produced under processor incentives

from those derived under alternative market
forces. Namely, processor incentives for slot
ting allowances require an element of inter
mediation between the farm product market
and the wholesale market and are promoted
by elastic retail demand conditions, inelastic
farm supply conditions, and large retail mar
gins. Ex post, the effect of slotting allowances
was shown to narrow retail margins, and evi
dence was provided that the gross retail margin substantially decreased in the frozen vegetables category relative to that in the fresh
vegetables category in the period that slotting
allowances emerged.
An alternative explanation for the recent
narrowing of the gross retail margin on pro
cessed foods relative to commodities is the
proliferation of branded, processed goods. To
the extent that product proliferation makes re
tail demand (per brand) more elastic, an in
crease in the variety of processed products
would place downward pressure on the gross
retail margin for processed goods relative to
commodities. It is interesting to note that this
trend toward differentiated processed goods
may be related to the emergence of slotting al
lowances. An increase in the elasticity of retail
demand would provide a larger incentive for
food processors to employ slotting allowances,
which suggests that a potentially important
nexus may exist that links the coincident trends
toward slotting allowances and product prolif
eration in the processed product categories.
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